By Phyo Lin Aung – November 2
It is evident that a policy of isolation or exclusion has not proved to be an effective solution for ASEAN. In the specific context of Myanmar, this approach failed to yield any resolution and effectively resulted in five years of wasted time. On October 23, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, revealed to Reuters that the upcoming 49th ASEAN Summit—scheduled to be held in Manila from November 16 to 18—may expect a review and discussion regarding the future status of Myanmar’s representation, which has been suspended since 2021.
It can be argued that recent political developments in Myanmar indicate that the time has come to restore the country’s right to representation within ASEAN. Since assuming office, the Myanmar government has remained steadfast in its commitment to—and has actively pursued—two primary objectives: national stability and development. However, ASEAN just assesses Myanmar’s political progress based on the extent to which the country has fully implemented the provisions of the Five-Point Consensus.
ASEAN’s 5PC and the Myanmar reality
As Myanmar representatives did not directly participate in or agree to the formulation of these consensus points in 2021, Myanmar viewed them as ASEAN statements rather than consensus agreements. Nonetheless, because these statements were not difficult to follow, the Myanmar government agreed to comply with them. Despite this, ASEAN has continued to issue assessments expressing dissatisfaction with the on-the-ground implementation to date.
Regarding the immediate cessation of violence— the first point of the ASEAN 5PC—it should be noted that the NUG and PDF, which emerged after 2021, are opposing and fighting against the government based on a specific political ideology. However, after more than five years, their original objectives have faded, and their activities have devolved into little more than armed profiteering.
In this context, the conflicts between ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the government cannot be equated with the aforementioned situation; these groups have long been armed. Nevertheless, it is evident that the government is currently making significant efforts to bring all of them onto the path of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Those who choose not to participate in peace talks—despite the government’s invitation to engage without any preconditions—can be considered to favor a path of violence.
Furthermore, for the PDFs who rely on fundraising under various revolutionary banners—donations are likely contingent upon them demonstrating active combat; consequently, acts of violence from their side are bound to persist. Therefore, while violence cannot cease as long as armed groups continue their attacks, the government has already effectively halted its own offensive operations in the interest of peace.
Regarding constructive dialogue involving all relevant stakeholders as the second point of 5PC, the government has extended invitations to peace talks to both signatories and non-signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) under the framework referred to as "NCA Plus." Moreover, the government has not obstructed or prohibited meetings between Myanmar’s armed groups and certain ASEAN member states. For instance, in July 2026, a meeting took place in Pattaya, Thailand, attended by Threesa A. Lazaro—the Special Envoy on Myanmar for the ASEAN Chair along with representatives from the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) and several ethnic armed organizations. However, it cannot be acceptable for those actions—such as those seen in Timor-Leste—where the demands of ethnic armed groups were accommodated in a manner that challenged the sovereign authority of the Myanmar government.
Furthermore, regarding the third point—mediation by the ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy—representatives have been appointed on a rotating basis by successive ASEAN Chairs since 2021. Consequently, their efforts have effectively reset the process, requiring dialogue initiatives to begin anew each time. As the Thai Foreign Minister pointed out, "In most cases, this has yielded no substantive results, ending merely with meetings involving various groups, including opposition factions." Thus, this third point represents a weakness within ASEAN itself, rather than something intrinsically linked to the evolving situation in Myanmar.
As for the point of humanitarian aid, ASEAN has been able to operate with a degree of freedom within Myanmar. From October 28 to 29, a humanitarian delegation led by the ASEAN Special Envoy visited Myanmar. Lazaro and the Jakarta-based AHA Centre traveled to Taunggyi and met with local relief officials to discuss humanitarian needs.
Regarding the final point—the Special Envoy’s access to all relevant stakeholders—while permission has been granted to meet with all parties involved in the conflict, the request from ASEAN to meet with the imprisoned Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains difficult to accommodate. Dr. Khaing Khaing Soe, spokesperson for the President’s Office, responded “When the ASEAN Special Envoy requested a meeting with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, she was serving a prison sentence following her conviction under the law. Therefore, she cannot meet with international representatives. Once she has completed her sentence, such a meeting could be possible. Currently, such a meeting cannot take place because she is serving her sentence.”
Therefore, an overall assessment of the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus reveals that Myanmar has consistently demonstrated flexibility and cooperation—making concessions in all areas, except for those that would compromise its national sovereignty. From ASEAN’s perspective, the perceived lack of progress may well stem from inherent weaknesses and flaws within the consensus itself.
Strategic imperatives for ASEAN reintegration
Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak himself observed that, over the past five years, ASEAN has done little more than repeatedly reaffirm the Five-Point Consensus on paper and grant the ASEAN Special Envoy a mandate to operate; in practical terms, however, these efforts have yielded no tangible results. “To be very frank, what have we done under the Five-Point Consensus, other than repeating the Five-Point Consensus and appointing a special envoy?” The Thai Foreign Minister pointed out.
Since the new government took charge after the election, Myanmar has not only been trying to reengage relations with powerful countries, also trying to keep in touch with ASEAN countries. During the 6-month term of the new government, the President visited Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Malaysia as well as plans to visit other ASEAN members. In addition, most of the ASEAN member countries have started to recognize that the political situation in Myanmar has improved.
In an exclusive interview with The Straits Times on October 8, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who is also the current chairman of ASEAN, said that there has been some progress in bringing the Myanmar government to the discussion table. Also, since the 5PC that was established exclusively for Myanmar no longer works, some ASEAN countries have started to adopt new approaches and try to re-engage with Myanmar.
"Malaysia will do whatever is possible to make sure that we ... ultimately, take Myanmar as part of our community of nations, without prejudice. Particularly in the context of ASEAN," Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said in a press conference after meeting with President U Min Aung Hlaing.
Also, Myanmar's peace, in his speech at the 81st United Nations General Assembly held on September 24, Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul stated that Thailand supports peace, national reconciliation and a durable solution in Myanmar that is Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned.
Therefore, Myanmar's political situation is in the best state of development, and Myanmar's peace is already progressing, while most ASEAN leaders have recognized it. Such a situation can be defined as a good time to re-enter Myanmar into the ASEAN community.
Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak already suggested as early as August that ASEAN leaders should reconsider their stance of barring high-ranking Myanmar officials from attending the upcoming ASEAN Summit in the Philippines. He further noted concerns among ASEAN member states that, should Myanmar become isolated from the bloc, it could turn into a theater for great-power rivalry.
In the current geopolitical landscape, Myanmar’s efforts to re-engage with Western nations have, in fact, prompted armed groups in the northern Shan State to heighten their military readiness. To prevent another escalation like Operation 1027 and ensure Myanmar does not become a battleground for a "proxy war," it is time for the ASEAN community to reconsider its policy of sidelining the country. Therefore, given recent positive political developments in Myanmar and the efforts toward re-engagement, the ASEAN community’s decision to embrace and guide Myanmar forward is the only correct solution for regional peace and a sustainable future. –
